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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANDREA N. KEENE, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
vs. 
ASHLEY J. BONSER, 
Respondent and 
Appellant 
REPLY BRIEF of the APPELLANT 
Case No. 20030841-CA 
ARGUMENT 
Appellee (hereinafter "Keene") makes two arguments, neither of which respond to 
Appellant's (hereinafter "Bonser's") opening brief, but which illustrate the fundamental 
difference in the parties' understanding of the Cohabitant Abuse Act (hereinafter "Act"). 
Bonser understands that the Act is limited to those who are "cohabitants" (as defined in 
the act itself) who engage in various acts which are criminal, independently from the Act. 
Keene's view is more expansive. In her view the Act's application is dependent upon the 
type of activity engaged in by the parties, rather than whether the parties meet the 
statutory definition of cohabitant. Keene's arguments will be dealt with in the order 
presented. 
1 
POINT I 
KEENE ERRS WHEN SHE ARGUES "THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE ORDER 
... [because]... THE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ARE SO INSUBSTANTIAL AS NOT TO 
MERIT FURTHER PROCEEDING." 
Keene reargues, almost verbatim, the argument she previously made to this court 
in her motion for summary disposition that "[t]he appellate court should affirm the order 
which is a subject of the review by this court on the basis that the grounds for review are 
so insubstantial as not to merit further proceeding. " Keene deleted the word "appellate" 
from the heading and focused solely on the parties conduct, while ignoring entirely the 
issue of whether the parties were "cohabitants" under the statutory definition. Keene 
seems to argue that the definition of "cohabitant" should be broadly construed because 
the protections of the act will be otherwise "eroded." 
Clearly the Utah legislature could have chosen to define the term "Cohabitant" 
more broadly to encompass those who frequently engage in intimate relations, but do not 
live in a common abode or meet the "hyper-technical" traditional definitions of residing 
in a common residence. The legislature did not do so. When the legislature defined the 
term "cohabitant" in terms requiring a common residence, it clearly meant to indicate that 
to attain the status of being a cohabitant, one must intend to permanently live in a 
common abode or home one with the other. In other words if a police officer asked 
where you live, the truthful response would be in that common abode. And as will be 
discussed below, this Court should not expand traditional notions of residence in this 
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case. In any case, Bonser's claim that he was not a cohabitant under the statutory 
definition is not so insubstantial as to warrant dismissal. 
POINT II 
KEENE ERRS WHEN SHE ARGUES THAT "THE TRIAL COURT MADE 
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS AS TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE RESPONDENT WAS 
A COHABITANT " 
In making that second argument Keene utterly fails to set forth what findings the 
trial court did make and where those findings could be found. While it is perhaps not her 
burden to do so, those findings are vague at best and Keene again focuses on the findings 
of violence. But those acts are "domestic violence" only if committed by a cohabitant. 
Keene gives only one citation to any authority in her second argument, Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 116 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). Reid deals with the evidentiary basis for 
findings that were actually made, not the failure to state a factual finding itself. Here the 
lower court simply made no findings on the issue of cohabitation. Thus it is impossible to 
tell if nonexistent findings were clearly erroneous. 
Keene argues, as she did in the court below, that the statute should be broadly 
interpreted to include persons in her situation and that the protections of the statute would 
be eroded by any narrower construction. Keene completely fails to provide this court 
with analysis or authority to support her bare assertion. Generally, statutes are interpreted 
according to their plain meaning, with courts supplying nothing save interpretation of 
vague provisions. 75 Am. Jur. 2d 393, Statutes, §196 (1974). 
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Well-settled rules of statutory interpretation instruct us that [w]hen interpreting a 
statute, this court looks first to the statute's plain language to determine the 
Legislature's intent and purpose. 
Hansen v. Eyre,, 2003 UT App 274, <fl 7. 
Bonser believes that the definition found in Utah Code Ann. §30-6-l(2)(a - f) 
(1993) is specific, narrowly drawn, clear and unambiguous. An emancipated person or 
one who is 16 years of age or more may be a cohabitant if they fall within one of the six 
categories of the definition, but if they don't, they simply are not cohabitants. Those 
categories are not broad, but specific. The legislative enactment itself leaves no doubt as 
to the intended coverage. The first five categories involve marriage, children and blood 
relationships, but the last is dependent upon residence. The lower court had no difficulty 
eliminating the first five categories because clearly the relationship between Bonser and 
Keene did not fall within any of those categories. 
With respect to the last category the lower court concluded that the parties were 
"residing or had resided in the same residence, residence being her house trailer with a 
bedroom and a bed." Transcript 91, Appendix B, Appellant's Opening Brief. 
Notwithstanding Keene's claim in her brief, the Trial Court, did not make any findings 
other than that ultimate conclusion set forth above. However, the Court did state "I think 
the Court would interpret that as a broad definition to cover folks who are entitled to 
protective orders that have resided or are residing in the same residence." (Transcript 90, 
Appendix B, Appellant's Opening Brief.) The trial court's statement indicates that it 
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impermissibly added to the definition of cohabitant in its interpretatioi t In short tlle 
lower court ruled that if there is some abuse, the parties must be cohabitants, because 
KCCI.J :! - .:;.: ire cnaiiCd to a protective order. 
The Col ii I; of \ ppeals i ecentl> held tl lat 
'. n considering the plain language of a statute, courts " 'presume that the 
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according 
to its ordinary and accepted meaning.'' We consider other methods of 
statutory construction only when a statute is ambiguous. 
State v. Germonu-. 2<MM U i App 217, %,, ;j iJ.3d 978,(Ltali App. loOj »v.ru.ig 
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 2001 UT 29,lj 12, 24 P3c\ <PR Milr]intli-. I 
citations omitted). 
Unfortunate liic 1 rial Court did not explicitly stale that the statutory definition 
w a s a m b i g U O U S " •" - " ' ^ •* ! - \ '-: •.' ; \ ^ ; - . !••:: --1-* i d u i i v . \ i i U ^ l . n M i M l ] ] ; ' ! } ,..;^ 
not elaborate on why the plain meaning of the words should be expanded, he just aid 
It cannot be seriously questioned that the legislature was well acquainted \\ iih thv 
"' r- I 'rc^-i" •* l • : .y. !;\ ,'.*._ .ii, intentional act of 
making one's abode in a particular place and the intention to make that place one's 
permanent home, thus the Trial Court's departure from traditional rules of statutory 
L'otistnidif «n i-; :i ni\ sk '"•), 
It is undisputed that Keene had a residence in 1\ fan Ilia, [ Jtali, to wit: her hoi lse 
trailer with bedroom and a bed; however, it is likewise clear that the Trial Court was 
P^: -;;t:vr.v **; \: i>;\i^'. ,-W V.: :\u.:-j^a .;. make uiaii 1;^  rcMUChcc. I uc i rial Court found 
that it was not necessary for Bonsei to make I Jtah his residence. I 'ranscript 91, lines 1 2 
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Appendix B, Appellant's Opening Brief But how else could he reside with Keene, who 
did make Manilla, Utah her residence? What the evidence shows is that Bonser was, at 
best, a frequent overnight visitor in Ms. Keene's residence, but did not intend to make her 
residence his residence. That is absolutely not the same thing as saying that the parties 
shared a common residence. 
In this case, Bonser was a cohabitant only if he was a resident of the same 
residence as Keene. If Bonser was not a resident there, the Cohabitant Abuse Act did not 
apply. Keene could ask the State of Utah to prosecute Bonser for any criminal behavior 
and Keene herself could seek equitable relief through a restraining order, a peace bond or 
some other legal or equitable remedy; however, she could not seek a Protective Order 
under the Cohabitant Abuse Act unless Bonser resided in her residence. A common 
residence, however, may not be in two different states, or it is simply not the "same 
residence." 
The Trial Court, however, found that Keene had her residence in Manilla, Utah. 
Then it interpreted the statute to allow Bonser to choose to not make Utah his residence, 
yet still reside with Keene, who did reside in Utah. There is no explanation of how that 
could be possible and the appellate court is left to simply speculate. 
Keene argues: If the Court adopts Appellant's narrow scope of legal residency, the 
statute will be diluted and protections eroded. The courts will be limited in issuing 
protective orders in areas such as Manilla, Utah where persons travel back and forth 
6 
across state lines. A person could ;noi<| a riimliiie ol cnhMbitiilimi bused upon ,i < Linn flut 
they are of legal residence in another state or location. Appellee's Brief p. i J . 
With respect to cohabitant protective orders Keene is exactly right, and rightly so! 
The uiHiils are limited 11 i\ llie legislaluie lliai defines sUiUilui) knns. 1 he legislature • 
defined the term "cohabitant." It used the words "residence" and "re-ad:- r ,! ML 
its definition and those terms hn\e well established meanings. If one is not a cohabitant 
• i , -ni-.i. a. •; ••. .: ^ . ••IK-..% i.iii cnuik'c; to a protective order under the Act 
Other remedies notwithstanding, the Protective Order mi ist be denied i iiiless both pai tie s 
were cohabitants. 
CONCI I ] SIGN 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Coi irt reverse the decision of the ti ial coi u: t 
and dismiss Appellee's petition for a protective order. 
>r[) "-^ ^-tjTda\ v if June, 2004. 
McIN rYRE&GOI DEN I X . 
V 
XJM^ u.H\ ST 
JAMES^^.MclNlYRh 
Attorney for Respondent Appellant 
Respondent's address: • ^ y 
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